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Street trading is ubiquitous in African cities, but despite 
research over the last 40 years, there has been relatively little 
analysis of the political factors that influence the street 
economy. It is thus timely to examine the broader political 
landscape of street trading and its influence on the operations 
and vulnerabilities of street trade. The paper first frames 
concepts of street trade and the street economy, and briefly 
examines the political landscape in Africa. It then develops and 
tests an exploratory framework through which to examine the 
relationship of politics to street trade, examining three broad 
areas: colonial legacy and politics across borders, the top-down 
politics of state repression and accommodation, and the bottom-up 
politics of trader organisation and voice. The paper draws on 
extensive research by the authors in Africa and published papers 
to examine how the influences of history, culture and religion, 
governance and politics have influenced the operation of street 
trading across Africa today. The paper concludes that each axis of 
the proposed tripartite framework has merit, but that many gaps 
exist in understanding the relationship between politics and 
street trade in Africa. 
 
Introduction 
Street trading is dynamic and pan-African in reach, but understandings of the extent to 
which political freedoms influence the operation of street trade are still weak. Although a 
traditional sector in most countries of the region, since the independence movement which 
saw 46 countries in the region gain independence during the 20 years from 1957-1977, the 
character of street trade has changed from an outlet for local supply chains to a global system 
of exchange. Nevertheless, despite over 40 years of research and increased understanding of 
the economic and organisational systems of street trade, the paucity of national and city-level 
data means that comparative analyses over time are rare, and there has been relatively little 
analysis of the political factors that influence the vulnerabilities of street traders. 
There are many different entry points to examine the influence of the political landscape on 
street trade. The aim of the paper is to develop an exploratory framework which examines the 
relationship of politics to street trade, examining three broad axes: colonial legacy and politics 
across borders; the top-down politics of state repression and accommodation, and bottom-up 
influence of trader organisation and political voice. Each theme is introduced with a general 
discussion and illustrated with case studies from published research and the authors’ research 
over the last decade, to assess their potential for understanding the political influences on 
street trade. 
The paper was partly inspired by research in Ethiopia and Rwanda, both countries that 
have emerged through civil war with highly centralised governments. In both countries, street 
trading is tightly controlled and mainly allowed when traders work in recognised cooperatives 
or designated space. The operation of street trading is thus tolerated but within strictly 
controlled limits. 
The ubiquitous informal economy 
The scale and scope of the informal economy 
Over the last three decades, many countries have witnessed a dramatic increase in the 
informal economy, with street vending amongst the most visible trades, and informality is 
now seen as a ‘generalised mode of metropolitan urbanisation’ rather than a temporary state 
of exception (Roy 2005). Informality is often seen as compensating for lack of successful 
urbanisation, where spaces of habitation and livelihood formation are becoming more opaque 
and impenetrable (Simone 2005). The informal economy is usually taken to mean 
employment and production that takes place in unincorporated or unregistered small 
enterprises plus all other employment without formal contracts or social protection. Estimates 
from the ILO suggest that two billion of the world’s population aged 15 and over work 
informally, representing 61% of global employment – in Africa it rises to 76%, and in most 
countries, more women than men work informally (ILO 2018: 13, 21). Of the 31 countries in 
Africa for which ILO data was available, the proportion of informal employment as a 
percentage of non-agricultural employment ranged from 34% in South Africa to 90% in Benin 
and Togo (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of total non-agricultural employment 
 
Source: ILO 2018 (presented by authors) 
 
City level data on the informal economy is rarely available but is important to underpin 
economic inclusion. In a rare study, the French institute DIAL produced estimates for 11 
cities using 1-2-3 survey methods, specially designed to study the informal sector, involving 
three sequential surveys: a light labour force survey using ILO indicators; interviews with a 
sample of informal enterprises, and an expenditure survey (Herrera et al. 2012).  
While no overall estimates exist on numbers of street traders, consensus suggests that the 
sector is increasing. In this paper, street trade is taken to cover all trading activity that takes 
place from streets or public space and the supporting activities that enable that trade, much of 
which is informal. Of particular interest is the concept of the ‘street economy’, the cumulative 
impact of street trading activities across a huge variety of sectors that together form 
significant elements of the urban economy. 
The paucity of data means that many studies have drawn on case studies of cities and 
markets, although and some cross-country analyses have been undertaken. For example, 
Skinner (2010a) records studies on street trading in West Africa (Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana), Central Africa (DRC), Southern Africa (Zambia, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa, Lesotho) and East Africa (Tanzania, Kenya). More recent research has looked at 
Togo, Mali, Tunisia, Egypt, Nigeria and elsewhere (Lyons and Brown 2010, Brown et al. 
2017, Omoegun 2015). Skinner (2010a: 215-216) argues that the growth of street trade has 
been driven by urbanisation and international migration, spurred by political crises and civil 
wars. Particularly significant were the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980-90s, and 
the migration resulting from civil war in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Sierra Leone, DRC, Liberia, Uganda and Somalia (Skinner 2010a). 
Also significant has been the development of private sector business paradigms and 
burgeoning China-Africa trade (Skinner 2010b, Hansen et al. 2013, Lyons and Brown 2010). 
Hansen et al. (2013) consider the embeddedness of street economies within cultural practices 
and norms, and identify profound economic changes that are shifting the landscape of street 
economies. Some research has explored state/trader relations – in cities with pro-vendor 
policies informal markets may sometimes be legitimised, while in cities that focus on control 
and evictions, riots and on-going mistrust between traders and city authorities often result 
(Skinner 2010b, Hansen et al. 2013). Others have explored the comparative legal frameworks 
within which African street trading operates and the impact on street trade of codified civil 
law and the more flexible approach of common law (Brown 2017: 7). 
A particularly rich vein of scholarship has examined the impact of neoliberal development 
paradigms on the important trading areas in city centre streets. As cities compete for private 
and foreign investment in a global economy, property investment underpins capital 
accumulation to the detriment of the poor, who are increasingly excluded in battles over 
central (lucrative) urban space (Mackie et al. 2014, Skinner 2010b, Miraftab 2011). Cross and 
Morales (2007: 7) see street trade as a “reasoned reaction to local manifestations of today’s 
economic, cultural and social world”. Others see neoliberal development as a predominantly 
negative process leading to casualisation of the workforce, in which the formal and informal 
sector are interdependent forms of production in both the global North and global South 
(Graff and Ha 2015).  
Despite the growing body of comparative literature on street trade, there has been 
relatively little analysis of the street economy and street livelihoods in relation to the political 
context in which traders operate, for example: the extent to which former colonial relations 
influence international trading patterns, attitudes towards political inclusion in nominal 
democracies, and the effective influence of freedom of speech and association and its links to 
political patronage. While these major themes require extensive research and analysis, this 
paper draws upon existing evidence and unpublished material from the authors’ extensive 
research in Africa, to explore a new framework for understanding the relationship between 
politics and street trading. The paper now briefly discusses the comparative political economy 
of street trade in Africa before considering each of the three themes in more depth. 
Politics and development in Africa 
Much has been written about the political and economic development of Africa – the 
influence of colonial history on legal, economic and political systems; ethnic and religious 
divides; urbanisation prospects and the mass movement of peoples (e.g. Padayachee and Hart 
2010, Molaka 2002, Simone 2011, Parnell and Pieterse 2014). Fifty years ago, there was 
considerable optimism about Africa’s economic prospects. For example, in 1960, Ghana’s 
GDP per capita was three times that of Indonesia and 1.5 times that of South Korea – by 2006 
the situation had completely reversed, and Indonesia’s economy was nearly 3.5 times 
Ghana’s, and South Korea’s was 47 times larger (Lawrence 2010), although it can be argued 
that regional generalisations blur differences between countries and sub-regions in Africa. 
In relation to political freedoms, a widely quoted assessment of political rights and civil 
liberties is the annual report of the NGO Freedom House (Freedom House 2015, Figure 2). 
Although not without critics for its US-bias (The Economist 2008), the report ranks countries 
according to their human rights’ record on the basis of i] political rights, e.g. free and fair 
elections (ranks 1-7), ii] civil liberties e.g. freedom of expression, assembly, association, 
education and religion, and iii] the fairness of the legal system (ranks 1-7). The combined 
assessment ranks countries as ‘Free’, ‘Partly-Free’ and ‘Not Free’. The assessments for Africa 
are shown in Figure 2. 
Of the 55 countries in Africa, nine were assessed as ‘Free’, 23 as ‘Partly Free’ and 23 at 
‘Not Free’. Sub-regional differences are significant, Western and Southern Africa being 
markedly more open than Central and Northern Africa (Figure 2). In northern Africa, Tunisia 
is a bright spot, due to the adoption of a progressive constitution, and free and fair elections 
but it is threatened by unrest in neighbouring Libya. Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by 
volatility, and new leadership in Zimbabwe and Angola is still to have an effect (Freedom 
House 2018). For street traders, the critical issue is the implication of political and civil 
freedom in attaining legitimacy and accessing space. There is some correlation between the 
two data sets, which suggests that countries with ‘Free’ political systems tend to have smaller 
informal economies (presumably related to the rule of law), although there are outliers and 
analysis of the sub-categories may reveal a closer association. 
 
Figure 2: Freedom in the world, results for Africa 
Country Free Part Free Not Free 
Northern 
Africa Tunisia Morocco Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan 
Central 
Africa   
Central African Republic, Chad, 
DR Congo, Cameroon, Republic 






Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
Western 
Africa 
Benin, Cabo Verde, 
Ghana, São Tomé & 
Principe, Sénégal 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 





Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, 
Tanzania 
Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Uganda 
Source: Freedom House (2018) 
 
During the 1980s, almost all African economies entered a period of sharp economic 
decline. In response to burgeoning national debt, many African governments sought help from 
the IMF, which imposed conditions on debt management and loans. This ‘structural 
adjustment’ reduced the state’s role in the economy, cut services to the poor and imposed a 
system of governance and the rule of law seen as essential for loan eligibility. Allen (1995) 
argues that the response of regimes to the economic downturn depended on the weakness of 
the economy, the residual strength of the regime and the willingness of leaders to bow to 
democratic reforms. In many cases, Allen argues, the new economic regime led to state 
collapse and endemic violence. The impact on informal economies was significant – in many 
countries a traditional sector was transformed through massive increases in numbers, as a 
result of retrenchment of state workers. 
In parallel, academics have lambasted the failure of international aid, and of the neoliberal 
philosophy with stinging critiques of the impact of structural adjustment of economies on the 
urban poor. After 2000, economic growth trajectories were rapid but have declined sharply 
since the global financial crisis of 2008-09 (World Bank 2016a). Since its 2000 accession to 
the World Trade Organization, China has become the new power in Africa, offering state aid 
for health and education, a leading competitor in construction of high-profile infrastructure 
and state development projects, and a major trading partner for the import of manufactured 
goods. Unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, Chinese foreign policy adopts a philosophy of 
non-intervention in the affairs of other states (Alden 2007).  
We also know that street trade and the informal economy are closely connected to global 
economic trends. For example the Informal Economy Monitoring Study undertaken by 
WIEGO, based on interviews and focus groups over four years with 1,953 workers in 10 cities 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America found extensive links with the formal economy, and 
influence of macro-economic trends (WIEGO 2014). Many countries in West Africa, 
particularly francophone countries that share the West African CFA currency (Franc 
d’Afrique Centrale), pay little heed to border controls, which can be avoided or ‘negotiated’ 
with a facilitation payment. 
A framework for analysing politics and street trading in 
Africa 
The relationship between politics and street trading is complex but we propose that it can 
usefully be explored along a framework of three axes: colonial legacy and politics across 
borders; politics of repression and accommodation, and political voice. The paper now 
examines each axis in turn. 
Colonial legacy and politics across borders 
Geography and politics matter for street traders, and some have argued that the post-
colonial lens is still relevant for examining the politics of current African states today. 
Evidence suggests that street trade is increasingly linked to wider markets, driven partly by 
the political context in relation to borders and migration, which differ significantly across 
Africa, as this section explores.  
French colonial policy established highly centralised governance with strong bureaucracies 
and a paternalistic approach towards Africans. In contrast, British rule was more adapted to 
local circumstances, and built on indigenous structures particularly where chieftaincy was 
strongly entrenched. In the post-colonial period, Tordorf (2002: 7-31) identifies three 
significant political trends: the move from pluralism towards single party rule and the 
personalisation of power. Economically many newly-independent nations remained tied to 
former colonial powers, whereby francophone countries benefitted from the two common 
currency zones. Industrialisation was low, and the post-independence period witnessed a rapid 
rise in urbanisation. The dominance of China as a new global power, its support for 
infrastructure and aid, and the proliferation of Chinese-manufactured goods in African 
markets has created new neo-colonial relations. 
In most of the world, high urban growth rates have been an indicator of economic success, 
but in Africa, urbanisation seems to have been decoupled from economic growth (Turok and 
McGranahan 2013). Some commentators have argued that colonial legacies are now 
overwritten by new political events and practices and the rise in diaspora populations (Young, 
2004), but this paper suggests that they are still evident in the governance and operation of 
street trade. For example, in ex-colonial Anglophone cities, such as Dar es Salaam, street 
trade was seen primarily as a ‘native’ activity and was confined to areas outside the colonial 
‘settler enclave’ where the main markets are often located today, such as Kariakoo in Dar es 
Salaam. In francophone cities, markets were integral to city design, for example the HLM 
market in Dakar, and Grande Marché in Lomé. 
At national scale, colonial histories strongly influence street trading. In a fascinating study, 
Sylvanus (2007) explains how from the 17th century Javanese batik fabric was traded in West 
Africa by Europeans sailing to the East Indies. European textile manufacturers industrialised 
production and from the end of the 19th century, textures and designs were adapted to the 
African market, and diversify from Asian trade. By the 1950s, distribution was controlled by 
‘Nana Benz’, powerful ‘market queens’ who monopolised the regional distribution of waxed 
cloth – so called because they were the only ones able to afford Mercedes cars. The pagne, 
sold in 12-yard lengths for a dress and headdress, was extremely expensive and demonstrated 
social status. Since the late 1990s, Chinese influence has dominated as Shanghai-based firms 
have produced the fabric and slashed prices. Thus a former colonial trade relation has 
transformed into a global supply chain of textiles sold by market traders and hawkers in many 
cities.  
Traders located in port cities or border towns, and those trading in non-food goods, are 
often linked to import and transborder trades, particularly between countries with common 
colonial languages. The West African region sees huge movements of goods and people 
across borders, facilitated by membership of the 15-country ECOWAS region (Economic 
Community of West African States). Two ports are particularly important entry points for 
goods sold by street traders: the ports of Lomé in Togo (a freeport), and Conakry in the 
Republic of Guinea. Despite Togo’s tiny population of 7.3m people, in 2011 the port of Lomé 
handled 25% of the tonnage of Nigeria’s two ports at Lagos. Conakry handled about half the 
tonnage of Lomé (MLC-CATRAM 2013: 122). 
Togo is a good example of the complexity of cross-border trade. As a country of seven 
million people, a sliver of land sandwiched between Anglophone Ghana and francophone 
Benin, trade and customs revenue is an important source of government income. National 
borders are seen as a bureaucratic hindrance rather than an identity divide. For example, 
although French is the official language, it is spoken by only a third of Togo’s population, and 
the ethnic Ewe language is spoken through much of southern Togo and a large swathe of 
eastern Ghana. In religion the country is mixed, and has a large Christian population in the 
south and Muslim population in the north, although half the population still follows traditional 
beliefs (World Bank 2016b). The coastal trade also spreads westward. For example, the 
tomato seller’s association in Accra, Ghana, owned a truck depot in Côte d’Ivoire, which they 
used for importing tomatoes in the slack growing season in Ghana – no one had formal papers 
for the border crossing (Brown 2006). 
The free trade status of the port, and relatively ‘fluid’ entry regulations (at least at the time 
of our interviews in 2007-10) meant that Lomé is an important transhipment port for other 
countries in the region. Relatively relaxed migration policies allowed large groups from 
neighbouring countries to settle in Lomé, who led the export trade routes, particularly to 
landlocked Mali and Burkina Faso. In 2008, we interviewed the head of the Malian traders in 
Hedzranawoe, a large government-run market, mainly for food sellers and the second-hand 
clothes traders who were relocated from the city centre about 30 years ago. There also were 
many Igbo traders from Nigeria, trading in shoes, clothes and cosmetics. Many of the teenage 
boys hawking goods on commission for larger enterprises were migrants from Burkina Faso. 
Negotiating customs posts and border trade is a useful skill, and for example, traders from 
Kumasi market in Ghana used to travel on a weekly basis to buy goods in Lomé, crossing the 
border with a bale of goods when a ‘friend’ was on duty. 
The trade in second hand clothes is a multi-national business, and frippe, mitumba (or 
many other names) originate from many countries – from the ‘throwaway’ societies of 
Europe, Australia, the US, and (for Muslim countries) Saudi Arabia. Nigeria is an enormous 
market, but bans the import of second hand clothing and African waxed cloth. In Lomé, we 
interviewed an Igbo trader who, with no fixed premises and 2-3 staff, every four weeks 
purchased a container of used clothes and rented a warehouse for a week. Then he invited his 
contact list of traders and transporters to sort and buy the clothes. Jeans were sold per unit 
(100 at a time), and T-shirts and smaller clothes by bale. Many of the bales went to Nigeria, 
by sea or land across Benin. In West Africa, inland countries such as Mali are usually the end 
of a long supply chain, with major cities acting only as a transhipment point for interior 
towns. In central Africa, Rwanda is also the end of a long supply chain from Kenyan ports via 
Uganda to Kigali. 
It is thus clear that the operation of street trade on the ground is significantly influenced by 
colonial legacies, economic and cultural zones of law and language, state attitudes to border 
control and the reality of cross-border movement of goods and people. 
Politics of repression and accommodation – influence from the 
top down 
At city scale, the top-down influence of the local state and political agendas of governance 
have a significant impact on street trade. Municipal authorities are key to the operation of 
street trade, but their politics vary from highly repressive to sometimes supportive and 
accommodating. In particular, the rise of economic neoliberal models of urban management 
gives little accommodation to street trade. Miraftab (2007) criticises the global rollout of 
neoliberal development paradigms and land dispossession, arguing that current urban 
revitalisation strategies and privatised service delivery exclude the poor and obliterate the 
potential for alternative development models to emerge. Chen et al. (2016) distinguish 
between the concepts of ‘informality from above’ referring to the way that local government 
regimes are implemented through legal ambiguity and bending the rules, and ‘informality 
from below’ associated with the strategies of the poor to navigate legal restrictions and market 
dynamics, explored further in this and the next section. 
City governments are at the front line in managing the urban informal economy, but local 
government remains under-funded and under-staffed, winning little national respect in much 
of the global south. Yet, as Devas et al. (2004: 194-5) conclude, in order to address poverty 
and exclusion city governments require democratic and participatory processes that move 
beyond clientelist favours to the delivery of services as a matter of right. Interventions need to 
value the delicate social and economic relationships that allow the poor to survive – ‘bad 
governance’ undermines the position of the poor, and can destroy livelihoods and jobs. Local 
government law is also an important parameter in urban management and the relationship 
between local administrations and street traders. 
Modern local government in the developing world faces many challenges. Constitutional 
recognition is important to ensure the longevity of local governments, but this poses 
challenges. For example in 2004, Lagos State won a court case against the Federal 
government defending its right to pass a law creating 37 new local government 
administrations for fast-growing Lagos without a change to the 1979 Constitution, which the 
central government opposed because of the costs that new administrations incur (Okafor 
2012). In Ghana, local councils are empowered to raise property rates but lack up-to-date 
rating lists. 
For many street traders, the actions of municipal government have significant 
repercussions, particularly the day-to-day activities of local government and the police, 
although perceived tolerance or intolerance of street traders may also result from national 
politics, tensions between national and local governments, and the degree of corruption of 
street-level bureaucrats. Based on research in Johannesburg, Pezzano (2015) argued that 
municipal authorities do not govern the complexity of informal trading on the streets, despite 
numerous policy documents. Instead they support a “neo-colonial reordering of space” 
(Steck et al. 2013: 147), thus reproducing historical patterns of repression and co-option, 
where governance is determined by relations between street traders, the plural state, the 
private sector and trades unions. 
In many cities, the management of urban street trade swings between benign neglect and 
heavy-handed crackdowns. Often cities operating within a relatively-free, or partially-free, 
political system tread warily with street traders, caught between the desire to court voting 
blocks, or confirm to international agendas on ‘formalising the informal economy’ and 
increasing tax revenue. The ILO has been a strong proponent of formalisation, arguing that 
countering the abuse of worker rights and poor working conditions typical of informal 
economy work. Achieving the ILO’s basic principles of decent work, worker rights, 
employment security, social protection and social dialogue, are best done through an 
integrated policy framework that moves towards gradual formalisation of informal economy 
workers (ILO 2014). 
Tanzania, for example, has a long history of policy vacillation on street trade. In 1983, the 
government enacted a penal code that branded all self-employed people as ‘unproductive’, 
and banned them from towns. Further legislation sought to encourage every able-bodied 
person to work, and required urban workers to carry a labour card (the nguvu kazi). In 
practice, this became enabling legislation bestowing a ‘right to work’ that allowed hawkers to 
operate legally (Nnkya 2006). By the early 1990s, an innovative participatory strategic 
planning project for Dar es Salaam set up a working group on petty trade, identifying the need 
to improve trading conditions, set up new markets and strengthen representation. The 
improvements lasted a decade, but by 2006-07 tolerance had run low, and the government 
initiated massive street trader clearances in all major towns, affecting perhaps a million 
traders (Lyons and Msoka 2010). Meanwhile in Dar es Salaam, the city council saw economic 
potential and built a 6-storey street trader mall, but this was off-pitch, so was never occupied. 
Before the elections of 2015, street traders were courted for their voting potential and more or 
less left alone. 
Kenya’s emphasis on economic growth has created a tense relationship with its street 
traders (Mitullah 2003), and the regulation of street trade in Nairobi exposes the neo-colonial 
characteristics of contemporary urban management. Linehan (2007) has shown how the 
Kenya Vision 2030, organised around three pillars of maintaining economic growth, a just 
society, and people-centred politics, also mobilised a neoliberal approach that marginalised 
street vendors. A 2007 census reported 14,000 traders in the city, selling food, magazines, 
clothing and other goods, and found that bylaw fines were the third largest source of city 
council revenue and provided additional income for the askari city guards. The city council’s 
vision document, Nairobi, the Choice of Africa aimed to ensure that the CBD provided a clean 
and secure business investment environment. Traders were not part of this vision, so from 
2006 onwards, police used tear gas and live ammunition in skirmishes with traders. 
Eventually, the private Nairobi Central Business District Association negotiated with the 
street traders persuading them to give up the struggle to work in the CBD and accept 
relocation to the off-centre Muthurwa market, resulting a suspension of violent repression 
against them at the price of spatial confinement, demonstrating that street trade is judged as 
valuable in terms of poverty reduction but undesirable in promoting spaces of international 
capital and emblematic public space (Morange 2015). 
An interesting study on discourse is the work of Popke and Ballard (2004) who, from an 
analysis of media and newspaper reports, describe how in Durban street traders were linked to 
post-apartheid discourses of urban change. Despite some accommodation by the city council, 
they found three prominent narratives in the discussion of street traders in Durban – chaos, 
congestion and pollution – suggesting that street traders epitomise deep-seated cultural 
anxieties inherent to South Africa’s political transition. While in the early 2000s, eThekwini 
City Council in Durban made imaginative attempts to accommodate street traders, the policy 
of accommodation was eroded during the 2010 FIFA World Cup when South African cities 
sought to present a modernist face to the world. Nevertheless, there are signs that a more 
conciliatory approach is now being adopted (Skinner 2017). Meanwhile in Cape Town, a 
study by Dickenson (2016) has shown how Congolese migrants re-formed urban space, 
regenerating the run-down suburb of Wynberg. 
There are a few examples of good practice in the governance and accommodation of street 
trade, but usually these exist when traders are sufficiently organised to claim political voice. 
For example, Durban was for many years considered a model of inclusive planning for street 
traders, but closer scrutiny shows a mixed picture (Skinner 2017). In 2001, following a 
number of innovative projects, the city adopted a supportive Informal Economy Policy, but 
this was issued at a time of local government reorganisation and many of the key staff were 
moved or left the administration. By 2004, a more free-market approach had been adopted, 
brought to a head by the announcement that in 2010 South Africa was to host the 2010 World 
Cup. A period of street clearances followed, which spurred street traders to organise, taking 
recourse to the courts. A proposed court case staved off major redevelopment plans for the 
Early Morning Market at Warwick Junction, and in 2015, traders mounted a successful court 
challenge to argue that the confiscation of goods is illegal and contrary to the constitution. 
However, although South Africa has the smallest informal economy in Africa, and strong 
legal institutions, accommodation is relatively rare.  
What these examples do not examine is how the political and administrative structure of 
local government and the way in which politicians are appointed impacts on street trade – for 
example through patronage, clientelist relationships, courting votes, or even simple altruism 
for less advantaged groups in society. This gap appears significant in understanding how 
street economies fare in African cities. 
Political organisation and voice – influence from the bottom up 
The complexity of political and economic environments in which street traders operate 
means that it is difficult for them to gain influence, and organisation is key to achieving 
political voice. Millions of the urban poor depend on informal systems to organise economic 
activity, but such networks are largely ignored in conventional approaches to urban 
management partly because many transactions are unrecorded (Murray and Myers 2006: 15). 
Informality based on complex associational structures is central to African urban economies, 
and while the organisation of street traders has been quite widely explored in the literature 
(e.g. Brown and Lyons 2010, Lindell 2010), it is discussed again here because it is so central 
to supporting political claim. Factors which influence street traders’ leverage include the 
wider environment of political freedom/unfreedom, operation of the rule of law, and the 
mechanisms through which political power is wielded. 
A key issue for street traders is how they create coalitions of interest as a basis for 
negotiation in their relationship with the local authority. It is difficult for poorly resourced 
local governments to process large numbers of small transactions, for example collecting fees 
from street traders, and for the disparate enterprises in the informal economy to combine 
interests, particularly when many of those transactions are in cash. Where the bargaining 
power of traders is weak, they lose out from major urban development and the privatisation of 
public services. For example, waste-pickers may lose access to dumpsites when waste 
collection is privatised, and street vendors are often dispossessed in historic area 
improvements (Bromley and Mackie 2009), as in Lagos, or by the introduction of new urban 
freeways and rapid transit routes. 
Another problem is that the systems of organisation already practiced by street vendors are 
not recognised by local administrations, although street traders often have well-established 
systems of self-management and policing. Santos (1997, 2006) argues that the neoliberal 
development model, with its reliance on markets and the private sector and accepted legal and 
judicial frameworks, ignores the ‘multiplicity of unofficial legal orderings and dispute 
resolution mechanisms that had long coexisted with the official legal system’ (Santos 2006: 
40). The neglect of non-state structures results in a widening gap between law-by-the-book 
and practice, and an increasing duality between transnational sectors and the internal social 
affairs. This duality he calls the ‘heterogeneous’ state, characterised by starkly different 
political and legal cultures in different economic and social fields (Santos, 2006). The 
allegiance of ‘market queens’ – leaders of product associations in Ghana – to traditional 
leaders illustrates such a quasi-legal ordering. 
Some have argued that an emphasis on formal organisations is inappropriate and arises 
from the ‘modernist’ agenda based on a Fordist/Keynsian approach to economic management 
(Cross 2000: 34, Cross and Morales 2007: 7). The relationship between modernity and the 
informal economy was always problematic, as increasing centralisation and state regulation 
made it more difficult for informal workers to meet proliferating legal requirements. Instead, 
they argue that street trading is a reasoned response to capitalist market economies and an 
integral part of the post-modern landscape; where capital follows profits without concern 
about workers’ welfare, post-modernity simply represents ‘business as usual’ for street traders 
(Cross 2000: 36). 
Lindell (2010: 7-14) adopts a rights-based approach in her seminal work on the importance 
of collective organisation in strengthening street trading livelihoods. Emerging trends 
suggesting a solidifying of street trader associations, sometimes allied to powerful interest 
groups, but including grassroots groups that are contesting policies, and claiming socio-
economic rights. Nevertheless, such groups represent heterogeneous informal actors, where 
those with advantageous trading positions may exclude the disadvantaged. Relations with 
dominating powers, particularly the local state, may be based on the view that street traders 
evading state regulation, or the contradictory position that unregulated economies are “central 
to the contemporary reconstitution of state power” resulting in clientalistic power relations 
through which the state extends power to society (Lindell 2010: 15). 
Social capital is a key asset in street economies, and Tostensten et al. (2001: 17) highlight 
the rich patina of associations in African polity – trades’ unions, chambers of commerce, 
choirs, youth clubs, developmental charities, and the like, with marked gender differences. 
The product associations of Ghana have existed since the 1930s. Each type of vegetable, 
product or craft has its own association, often gender specific, often chaired by a hereditary 
and widely-respected ‘market queen’ or ‘market king’, providing day-to-day market 
management, social support or bulk-buying facilities (Brown and Lyons 2010). Economic 
benefits also include the management of markets and trading spaces. For example, Mchimako 
is a SACCO and cooperative in Dar Es Salaam, which had a contract to manage the 
Mchikichini Market of about 7,000 traders (Brown et al. 2014). Political benefits include 
greater visibility in political debates and policy arenas. 
However, trader associations have varied objectives and constituencies. For Bénit-Gbaffou 
(2016), the lens of the social movement literature demonstrates the complexities of trader 
associations and difficulties of consolidating political voice – for example, different 
associations may cover varied spatial scales, focus on business development or policy 
advocacy, and have cooperative or antagonistic relations with the municipality. Her studies of 
the 2013 Operation Clean Sweep in Johannesburg, and the court challenge mounted by two of 
the city’s eight trader associations, supported by SERI (Socio-Economic Rights Institute), 
which successfully argued that the city was contradicting its own legislation, found that the 
legal action heightened entrenched divisions between trader associations and undermined 
relations with the municipality. 
A starting point for this paper was observation of similar approaches to managing street 
trade in Kigali/ Muhange, Rwanda, and in Addis Ababa/Hawasa in Ethiopia, and the 
difficulties of organising in a centrally controlled state, which has emerged through civil war. 
Both countries have pursued local government decentralisation but maintained strong 
oversight over the devolved authorities. In Ethiopia, decentralisation has been a fundamental 
feature of the transition from military to civilian rule. The most influential tier of local 
government is at woreda (or district) level, below which are kebele with around 5,000 
population each. According to Salilew, the ruling EPRDF party maintains tight control over 
the ‘so-called’ democratic institutions through its party structure and military and federal 
police, which ‘leaves no room for ensuring checks and balances when diversion occurs 
between theory and practice’ (Salilew 2016: 19). Rwanda has also followed a strong 
programme of decentralisation, with 30 districts, 416 sectors (imerenge). However, as 
Chemouni (2014) argues, while decentralisation has transformed the local administration and 
is hailed as a model of service delivery and participation, it has also been criticised as 
providing the national one-party government opportunities to strengthen the pervasiveness of 
state control based on building political obedience and technocratic capacity, reconciling an 
ambitious development agenda with security concerns.  
For street traders, their scope for organisation is severely curtailed. In Kigali/Muhange in 
Rwanda, street traders are required to form associations. Traders selling food must locate in 
government-run markets, and second-hand clothes traders in Kigali locate in Nyabugogo 
Market near the long-distance bus terminal. In central Kigali, a few street traders emerge in 
the late afternoon, after normal office (and policing) hours. In Muhange, reports of 
harassment (about a third of the 66 traders interviewed in 2015) were not high, suggesting 
voluntary cooperation. Yet, traders complained that if they traded in the street they were 
chased and fined by the traffic police or ‘defense’, but they could not afford the taxes or bank 
loan repayments in the markets, where customers were relatively few. Second-hand clothes 
there were seized and burned. In Addis Ababa/Hawasa traders were also strongly encouraged 
to form cooperatives, relocate into designated markets, and to register for payment of VAT. 
Those that are unregistered were considered by other traders to have an unfair advantage. The 
interviews found higher rates of harassment than in Rwanda, particularly for those trading 
outside designated markets, including problems with the police, and ‘pioneer associations’ 
which sought to trap them into membership. 
In more free-market systems, the problem of political co-option can be acute. Fourchard 
examines patron/client relationships in Lagos, and partisan politics of local patrons, 
association and union and political party leaders, to argue that the political networks between 
state officials and ‘civil society leaders’ are ‘part and parcel of the historical state formation 
in Nigeria and Lagos’ (Fourchard 2011: 1). The opposition between the Federal and Lagos 
State governments has led to a political agenda where urban management has more to do with 
electoral agendas than good planning. His analysis is borne out by more recent research. 
Omoegun (2015) studied the major clearances of street traders at Oshodi Junction in 2009, 
one of the main axes into Lagos and a major bus terminal, and the covert occupation of side 
streets by displaced traders. Their representation was weak, blocked by the powerful 
associations of market traders, which failed to represent their interests. For the displaced 
traders, a critical problem was a controversial appointment for the position of Iyaloja-General, 
the overall head of market-trader associations in Lagos. The new leader succeeded her 
grandmother, but was also the daughter of the former Governor of Lagos and chief of the 
ruling party, keeping control in the ‘family’ and ensuring that political neutrality was almost 
impossible. 
Conclusion 
The tripartite framework proposed in this paper, together with the supporting case studies, 
suggests that each analytical axis has merit but that many gaps exist in understanding the 
relationship between politics and street trade. 
Colonial legacy and the post-colonial evolution of governance and power have significant 
and lasting impacts on urban street trade, both on trade networks and urban legal frameworks 
and practice. As we have demonstrated, street trade is increasingly linked to regional and 
global markets, which are influenced by political contexts related to borders and migration, 
with both post-colonial, and modern-day international and Chinese influence. In West Africa, 
francophone countries retain cohesion as a strong trading bloc, strengthened by cultural and 
religious ties, and trading between major cities across porous borders is rife. East African 
trade between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda retains similar fluidity. Some countries have 
relatively open borders and border posts, and seaports, especially free trade ports, and provide 
a window to the continent for the import of goods from China, second hand clothes, and much 
else.  Landlocked countries and inland territories have more limited scope for scaling up or 
innovation. Nevertheless, the links between cross border trade on street economies – the 
influence on goods traded, migration and knowledge traded along these routes – deserves 
much wider exploration.  
At city level, the top-down influence of local government structures, the way in which 
decision-makers and politicians are appointed or elected, their strategies and visions and the 
extent to which neoliberal agendas exclude the urban poor, are highly significant in the 
exclusion or accommodation street trade. Despite extensive research on exclusions faced by 
urban street traders, relatively little is known about how the effect of the structure and 
responsibilities of local government, the transparency of decision-making and political 
patronage influences the street economy. The interplay of political structures and power vary 
over time, which partly explains the tenuous and short-lived nature of the more lenient 
governance approaches towards street traders, as the case of Durban exemplifies.  
The effectiveness of traders’ organisation as a bottom-up influence in claiming political 
space is also vital. In cities with relatively open political systems and strong presence of 
established rule of law, street traders can gain space for political negotiation through 
improved strategies of organisation and representation. For example, traders in Dakar and 
South African cities have been able to use political purchase to gain legitimacy – in both 
Johannesburg and Durban traders have successfully challenged the city councils in court. 
Where political rights and civil liberties are curtailed, the scope for organisation is limited and 
traders are less able to claim legitimacy for their sector or trade.  Countries such as Ethiopia 
and Rwanda with strong centralised control create little political space for trader organisations 
to gain purchase, and associations – where they exist – focus on social support such as 
childcare or funeral funds. South Africa, the country with the smallest informal economy in 
Africa and – arguably – a reasonably developed democracy, is the best example of street 
traders using the rule of law to claim rights and space. Thus, a relationship between 
organisational effectiveness and legal empowerment seems evident, but deserves wider 
examination. 
Thus all three axes suggested above, are useful to examine the influence of politics on 
street trade in Africa, but as this paper has highlighted, much is yet to be explored in 
contextual understanding of the political landscape in which street traders and street 
economies operate. While street trade is ubiquitous in modern African cities, and globally 
connected, in some contexts the political odds are more heavily stacked against those who are 
simply trying to survive. 
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